There are several flawed assumptions behind this question, which could improve your thinking if corrected.
The first is that simplicity is not a good metric to use for the goodness of a worldview. This was discussed in the answers to a prior question: https://philosophy.stackexchange.com/a/110052/29339 What really matters, per Popper, is predictive power.
The second is that physicalism is not clearly an ontology. Physicalism was embraced as a stand-in for materialism, after Einstein refuted that matter is fundamental. But "what physics studies" isn't an ontology, and this has been an ongoing source of disquiet in the post-materialist era. There are two issues for physicalism as an ontology. One is that physics studied the fusion of two things -- stuff plus relationships. Relationships have no energy, or mass, but are key to what the "stuff" behaves like. Under Popper's 3 worlds ontology, physics is actually studying worlds 1 and 3, not just world 1. This makes physicalism a dualist ontology.
The other issue is that for physicalism to work as a worldview, it needs to be more than an ontology, but also an epistemology. Physicalism is most comfortable with two epistemological views: global reductionism, and scientism, but most thinkers on both subjects have concluded that neither are the case. There are three major problems with these assumptions.
The first is that physics as a science is intrinsically incomplete. All active work in physics is outside current "known physics", and we are unable to define what any boundaries for "future physics". This leads to a definitional problem called Hempel's Dilemma. Hempel's Dilemma holds that one cannot define physics to exclude the things physicalists want to reject -- Gods, ghosts, spirits, etc -- without asserting a definition we know to be wrong. The second problem is that physics is just a field of science, and science in general is not derived scientifically, but rather as a subset of the philosophical practice of empiricism. So science, and physics, are by definition not the only sources of knowledge. The third problem is a practical one, that science itself has realized that global reductionism is likely not true, and emergence needs to be accepted as a real phenomenon. This leads to science as a whole accepting that other sciences besides physics discover things that physics cannot. The implication of this admission, plus the inability of science to self justify is also that non-sciences are very reasonably valid sources of knowledge as well.
In addition to these theoretical issues for physicalism, there are practical test cases, in which physicalist explanations for consciousness have repeatedly been found to fail, as they predict we should not be conscious. This is the famous "hard problem of consciousness". Physicalism also, by leaving no place in its ontololgy for values, tends to lead to a futilitarian or nihilist worldview, which leads to a failure in the test case of "is this a useful philosophy to live my life by".
These problems for physicalism reveal a problem for the assumptions behind your resort to Occam's Razor. Physicalism does not explain everything we would like a complete philosophy to explain. It has contradicting test cases, and theoretical inabilities to self justify, or address all of our desired philosophical questions. Occam invoked his Razor to sort between competing explanations that can both explain the same problem set. But if the explanations don't explain the full problem set, then Occam isn't a valid metric at all, even in Popper's rewrite.
It is the nature of philosophical worldviews that they all have these sorts of problems and challenge areas that they struggle with. Idealisms, Popperian Triplism, Spiritual dualism, Russellian neutral monism, emergent naturalist pluralism -- NONE of these does not have similar issues of test cases they struggle with, or theoretical problems that limit their range of applicable scope, etc. None of them can explain the "full data set of the world".
The better way to sort between philosophic worldviews is to treat them as Research Programmes, in the theory Imre Lakatos developed to better explain how science operates. https://www.scientowiki.com/Imre_Lakatos
Under Lakatos' criteria, the question you are asking would be transformed to -- is there a more progressive philosophic research programme than physicalism? All worldview frameworks can be characterized for their progressivity and regressivity. Physicalism was, 3/4 of a century ago, an immensely progressive programme. The issues I have noted have been accumulating, unresolved, and have degraded this progressivity over the last 3/4 of a century.
The consequence of the increasing recognition that physicalism is not delivering on the promise it had in the mid 20th century, has been a revival of philosophers pursuing the various alternatives I listed. However, I do not believe that any of these alternatives is currently demonstrating greater progressivity. There is instead in the communities pursing alternatives, the hope that an alternate programme can overcome past challenges that made it difficult to address failed predictions, or made that programme difficult to make useful predictions with at all. There is more speculation and hope, rather than demonstrated accomplishments, behind the current increasing pursuit of alternatives to physicalism.
