Christian wisdom and secular wisdom can usefully be compared. In their difference they are mutually elucidatory. The (secular) philosopher, John Kekes, is helpful here :
There are two traditions of thinking about [wisdom]. One claims the allegiance of Plato,
Aquinas, Descartes, and their disciples. The other
has the support of Protagoras and Montaigne,
and it has achieved its first full formulation by the
insufficiently appreciated Charron in De la
Sagesse.
Augustine's rethinking of the meaning of wisdom illustrates [the two traditions] .... [H]e alters its meaning by splitting it into two parts, distinguishing the
knowledge of divine things from human things and
limiting the object of wisdom to the divine. Knowledge of human things is scientia. Wisdom is ... sapientia ... an intellectual cognition of eternal things.
Both traditions think of the knowledge involved
in wisdom as providing a perspective upon the
human situation. For the first, metaphysical,
tradition this perspective is sub specie aeternitatis;
it views human affairs from the perspective of
eternal things, God, or the unchanging rational
order of reality. For the second, humanistic, tradition the perspective is sub specie humanitatis; a
view of the human situation from the human vantage point. For the first, the possession of wisdom
consists in understanding and willing the rational
order of reality. For the second, wisdom is to arrange human affairs for the benefit of humanity in
the midst of an indifferent reality. The distinction
between the two traditions is not absolute. The
metaphysical view is compatible with love of
humanity; nevertheless, this love is secondary, and
it must be informed by knowledge of eternal
things. Similarly, the humanistic view is not indifferent to impersonal knowledge of reality; indeed,
science is one of the glories of this tradition. All
the same, it insists that the human point of view is
unavoidable for humans. It should not go so far as
the mistaken Protagorean relativism believing that
man is the measure of all things, but it should
recognize that man is the measurer of all things.
My understanding of wisdom is humanistic.
The theoretical aspect of it is knowledge sub specie
humanitatis. And the objects of this knowledge ... "are not the specialities of the
most refined thinking ... [but] ... the commonplaces of the least refined thinking." More
specifically, it is interpretive knowledge of the
human significance the universal and unavoidable
limitations and possibilities have for living a good
life. How, then, is wisdom, thus understood,
action-guiding?
It is action-guiding negatively: by issuing warnings of what not to do if a person wants to have a
good life. Wisdom is corrective. It reminds the unwise of the relevance of their own descriptive knowledge to their pursuits. The proper occasions
for such reminders are those frequent lapses in
which we are attracted by ideals whose achievement is impossible due to human or personal
limitations. Wisdom guides action in two ways: by
differentiating between what is possible and impossible for anyone, and by drawing the same
distinction for a particular person in his context.
Wisdom licences the possible and warns against
the impossible. It identifies both the ideals to
which a person may reasonably commit himself in
pursuit of a good life and the ideals incompatible
with living well. (John Kekes, 'Wisdom', American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Jul., 1983), pp. 277-286 : 281-2.)
References
John Kekes, 'Wisdom', American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Jul., 1983), pp. 277-286.
E. F. Rice, Jr., The Renaissance Idea of Wisdom (Cambridge: Harvard, 1958), p.4.. [Study of Charron and his tradition. Book is still illuminating.)
D. Collins, The Lure of Wisdom, The Aquinas Lectures, 1962 (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1962). [See esp. discussion of Descartes.]