I’ve been reading a lot about metaphysics and modality, especially in line with Graham Oppy’s work. One of his key premises behind preferring naturalism over theism is that when it comes to global causal reality, naturalism has the same explanatory power as theism but is simpler.
For example, in regards to fine tuning, even if it is incredibly improbable for the constants that lead to life to be the way they are, it may be just as improbable (if not moreso) for God to have tuned the world in the way that He did given His omnipotence. Why did He choose to do X instead of Y? As such, the improbability remains very low, but naturalism is simpler. If one posits that God has an inbuilt preference for creating life in this way, then one can also posit that naturalism has an inbuilt law like preference for creating the constants in the way they are. Given no independent evidence of a God fine tuning constants, one can still consider that some naturalistic law does the same “explanatory work” without any independent evidence as well. Since naturalism posits fewer kinds of entities, it then remains preferred.
What’s interesting to me about this strategy is that the same response could be made to a voice in the clouds saying “Hi, I am God.” As long as it can’t be ruled out that mindless processes couldn’t create that voice, one can use the same line of reasoning to state, “Well, this voice may be very improbable, but it is just as improbable given God’s free choice and omnipotence. And if God has particular preferences, perhaps nature has those same preferences as well. But naturalism posits fewer kinds of entities; thus, it should be preferred.”
Something seems very counter intuitive about this reasoning and yet I also can’t find anything wrong with it. Would this reasoning apply?