It seems odd to me, to reflect that things in the world are the way they are, but not some other way.
Maybe ‘reason’ tells us why things are a certain way.
By structuring thinking, ‘reason’ lets us form mental constructs, objects of form, and not exist in some sort of chaotic mush of formless experience.
But what justifies how it works? What does it derive from, what is its basis, and essentially, what is it?
(Specifically, I am interested in what thinkers similar to Hegel or Proclus thought on this issue.)
It is odd that logic could seem so arbitrary to me, yet it is at the basis of this topic, and is inescapable as an explanatory factor.
It seems that the role of logic is necessary, in explaining the world - despite the attitude of certain skeptical positions, and people who simply believe that everything is fallible.
There seems to be a form to formlessness - an inherent way the phenomena of the universe get coherently structured, in relation to each other.
It seems that in a chaotic and undetermined mess, we would have such a dizzying array of choices that it would be odd that we would have to say one set of them is absolutely necessary - even to allow this type of questioning I am engaging in now; since what I seek is an ultimate theory, which would account for quite possibly everything.
With this being the case, I am now realizing that to doubt even reason itself is a bit impossible. For logic and reason is what allows things to be constructed at all. The understanding of semantics and of things like this question itself, is based on something being logical and calculable.
To doubt even this, would be to not even not doubt doubt itself. It would just be this weird thing of which is not even predicable of much of anything. Is it simply negating things of conventional logic? Well, this seems to use teh descriptors of conventional logic to do so as well, so then, is it the same? Well, this can't really be either for then what would be the difference? Besides, 'same' and 'different' 'being' and 'nonbeing' cannot apply to it. And yet, this characterization itself is a type of negation.