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In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant writes that conservation of matter is a priori synthetic:

Natural science (physics) contains a priori synthetic judgments as principles. I need cite only two such judgments: that in all changes of the material world the quantity of matter remains unchanged; and that in all communication of motion, action and reaction must always be equal. Both propositions, it is evident, are not only necessary, and therefore in their origin a priori, but also synthetic. For in the concept of matter I do not think its permanence, but only its presence in the space which it occupies. I go outside and beyond the concept of matter, joining to it a priori in thought something which I have not thought in it. The proposition is not, therefore, analytic, but synthetic, and yet is thought a priori and so likewise are the other propositions of the pure part of natural science (CPR B17ff).

Why does Kant consider such principles as a priori rather than empirical?

There is a beautiful passage in Feynman's Lectures where he argues why all kinds of principles which philosophers believe are necessary (that is, a priori), are actually empirical; in the passage he argues about the principle of relativity:

There is another school of philosophers who feel very uncomfortable about the theory of relativity, which asserts that we cannot determine our absolute velocity without looking at something outside, and who would say, “It is obvious that one cannot measure his velocity without looking outside. It is self-evident that it is meaningless to talk about the velocity of a thing without looking outside; the physicists are rather stupid for having thought otherwise, but it has just dawned on them that this is the case. If only we philosophers had realized what the problems were that the physicists had, we could have decided immediately by brainwork that it is impossible to tell how fast one is moving without looking outside, and we could have made an enormous contribution to physics.” These philosophers are always with us, struggling in the periphery to try to tell us something, but they never really understand the subtleties and depths of the problem.

Our inability to detect absolute motion is a result of experiment and not a result of plain thought, as we can easily illustrate. In the first place, Newton believed that it was true that one could not tell how fast he is going if he is moving with uniform velocity in a straight line. In fact, Newton first stated the principle of relativity, and one quotation made in the last chapter was a statement of Newton’s. Why then did the philosophers not make all this fuss about “all is relative,” or whatever, in Newton’s time? Because it was not until Maxwell’s theory of electrodynamics was developed that there were physical laws that suggested that one could measure his velocity without looking outside; soon it was found experimentally that one could not.

Now, is it absolutely, definitely, philosophically necessary that one should not be able to tell how fast he is moving without looking outside? One of the consequences of relativity was the development of a philosophy which said, “You can only define what you can measure! Since it is self-evident that one cannot measure a velocity without seeing what he is measuring it relative to, therefore it is clear that there is no meaning to absolute velocity. The physicists should have realized that they can talk only about what they can measure.” But that is the whole problem: whether or not one can define absolute velocity is the same as the problem of whether or not one can detect in an experiment, without looking outside, whether he is moving. In other words, whether or not a thing is measurable is not something to be decided a priori by thought alone, but something that can be decided only by experiment. Given the fact that the velocity of light is 186,000 mi/sec, one will find few philosophers who will calmly state that it is self-evident that if light goes 186,000 mi/sec inside a car, and the car is going 100,000 mi/sec, that the light also goes 186,000 mi/sec past an observer on the ground. That is a shocking fact to them; the very ones who claim it is obvious find, when you give them a specific fact, that it is not obvious.

Finally, there is even a philosophy which says that one cannot detect any motion except by looking outside. It is simply not true in physics. True, one cannot perceive a uniform motion in a straight line, but if the whole room were rotating we would certainly know it, for everybody would be thrown to the wall—there would be all kinds of “centrifugal” effects. That the earth is turning on its axis can be determined without looking at the stars, by means of the so-called Foucault pendulum, for example. Therefore it is not true that “all is relative”; it is only uniform velocity that cannot be detected without looking outside. Uniform rotation about a fixed axis can be. When this is told to a philosopher, he is very upset that he did not really understand it, because to him it seems impossible that one should be able to determine rotation about an axis without looking outside. If the philosopher is good enough, after some time he may come back and say, “I understand. We really do not have such a thing as absolute rotation; we are really rotating relative to the stars, you see. And so some influence exerted by the stars on the object must cause the centrifugal force.”

Now, for all we know, that is true; we have no way, at the present time, of telling whether there would have been centrifugal force if there were no stars and nebulae around. We have not been able to do the experiment of removing all the nebulae and then measuring our rotation, so we simply do not know. We must admit that the philosopher may be right. He comes back, therefore, in delight and says, “It is absolutely necessary that the world ultimately turn out to be this way: absolute rotation means nothing; it is only relative to the nebulae.” Then we say to him, “Now, my friend, is it or is it not obvious that uniform velocity in a straight line, relative to the nebulae should produce no effects inside a car?” Now that the motion is no longer absolute, but is a motion relative to the nebulae, it becomes a mysterious question, and a question that can be answered only by experiment.

nir
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  • I think there's an interesting question here, but right now it's mostly two quotes stapled together. Do you see Feynman as raising the objection to Kant's view in its best (or a good) form? – virmaior Oct 09 '15 at 08:17
  • I see Feynman as raising an objection to claims such as that particular claim of Kant; but I am not sure how far such an objection can be applied (for example, I personally cannot conceive a timeless world), and I am not sure why Kant made that particular claim about conservation of matter; was he just wrong or do I misunderstand him? how do Kantian scholars explain this? – nir Oct 09 '15 at 08:30
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    I think you (and Faynman) misunderstand (like most people do) the notion of a priori: Kant was (in some aspects) Humean, he agreed that every empirical judgement is in fact inductive and therefore not necessary (in the strict, logical sense). Necessity like the one thought in "a priori" is always between concepts. But this does not mean that these concepts and their relation could ever be thought without intuition. And intuition needs empirical input. A priori is abstract, between concepts, that must be "feeded" by concrete perceptions. – Philip Klöcking Oct 09 '15 at 09:41
  • @Philip Klöcking Until now I thought a priori means before and hence without experience. What do you mean in your last sentence by concepts, that must be "feeded" by concrete perceptions? And which role do you ascribe to the term intuition in Kant's epistemology? References to CPR would be helpful. Thank you in advance. – Jo Wehler Oct 09 '15 at 09:52
  • @JoWehler: The central piece of text could be "Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind." (A51|B75), (taken from Wikipedia about Kant), but this is a bad translation. In the original, it is more like "Intuitions (Anschauungen) without concepts (Begriffe) are empty, concepts without intuitions are blind." Taking this seriously, we cannot even think anything (this needs Begriffe) without Anschauung (and they need sensual input, as they are the manifold under concepts)...a priori therefore should be understood as before in a logical sense, a necessary condition – Philip Klöcking Oct 09 '15 at 10:11
  • @Philip Klöcking Kant introduces the term "knowledge a priori". Hence being a priori is a property of knowledge not of concepts. Concerning your statements about the relation of concept and intuition I agree with employing your quote. Because Kant says "But, though all our knowledge begins with experience, it by no means follows that all arises out of experience." Probably one should therefore clearly distinguish between 1. concepts. They need intuition. And 2. knowledge a priori. It is built from such concepts, but building such knowledge does not need experience. – Jo Wehler Oct 09 '15 at 10:49
  • @JoWehler: I would agree, because what is necessary for knowledge are rules and therefore judgement. And the "Vermögen" of judgement is reason. As for this complex, I would recommend a study of the third critique, where he in fact summarizes his whole project. Alas, I do not have the time at the moment to look for good references in this text. – Philip Klöcking Oct 09 '15 at 10:54
  • @nir Great quote from Feynman. Can you give the precise reference from his lectures? Thank you. – Jo Wehler Oct 09 '15 at 22:27
  • @JoWehler, http://www.feynmanlectures.caltech.edu/I_16.html (added to the post) – nir Oct 10 '15 at 17:11
  • I up-voted because I do think this juxtaposition of quotes creates a very fertile question, focussed concretely upon Kant's terminology. I suspect Feynman is a Kantian without knowing it. His own "outside" or unwittingly "transcendental" appeal is, in fact, to mathematics, which is synthetic a priori for Kant. I sense a symmetry between the quotes, but can't yet work it out. I believe Feynman's rotation argument is aimed at Leibniz and Mach, if I recall aright. – Nelson Alexander Oct 10 '15 at 17:47
  • Feynmans rotation argument was originally Newtons, and aimed at Liebniz. – Mozibur Ullah Oct 15 '15 at 10:41
  • @MoziburUllah, Newton is famous for his absolute rotation arguments, but I thought the one about rotation being relative to the nebulae is by Mach; isn't it? – nir Oct 16 '15 at 06:33
  • @nir: that's what I've heard too - but it wouldn't surprise me if similar or analogous arguments were made earlier. – Mozibur Ullah Oct 16 '15 at 06:55
  • Some historical perspective: Lavoisier was the chemist who was credited for confirming the conservation of matter via experimentation in 1773. Prior to that conservation of matter was accepted as an accurate assumption. Critique of Pure Reason was published in 1781. How much was Kant influenced by Lavoisier's experiments? – Idiosyncratic Soul Jan 15 '24 at 17:23

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The Copernican Shift of Kants philosophy actually was, in reference to Hume, that not the empirical facts themselves are true knowledge (episteme, "Erkenntnis"), because they are arbitrary; they depend on our ability to percept at all and our factual experiences.

True knowledge lies in transcendental knowledge: What we can get necessary knowledge of are the necessary conditions of our experience. As necessary conditions they lie in every experience possible to humans. In this sense they are a priori. Every knowledge a priori is transcendental and therefore necessary (in a strict sense).

For a reference and some argument on this, see the comments of the question and this answer.

Transferred to the quotes in the question: Kant would say that the conservation of matter isn't anything we can actually experience: We can measure in several moments and therefore infer this as necessary in form of a condition of what we experience. But in a strict sense, we do not experience this itself, we think it as necessary, which includes a further judgement of reason.

To add a general note: Nature = the sum of all experience. Laws of nature are the regularities in experience (Hume) thought as necessary. We do not experience this necessity, we think it. The necessity is of the rule for the relation expressed by the law, not for the truth or validity of the law itself. Therefore it is no problem for the necessity that laws of nature are falsifiable.

Philip Klöcking
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  • What do you think: Was Kant wrong when claiming that conservation of matter is an a priori knowledge? E.g. we know that particle and antipartice annihilate to pure energy. Of course Kant could not know about these features of matter and the insight E = m * c**2. But should we conclude, that conservation of matter cannot be knowledge a priori? – Jo Wehler Oct 09 '15 at 10:56
  • I think it actually shows the problems of the whole concept of knowledge a priori: It is in the end based on experience. And things one cannot conceive cannot be considered. Kant couldn't possibly conceive what we think now to be true, therefore he would, today, say it is conservation of energy what is knowledge a priori. And perhaps, as it is equated, it doesn't even matter. – Philip Klöcking Oct 09 '15 at 11:28
  • do you mean that for Kant something can be necessary and false at the same time? – nir Oct 09 '15 at 11:40
  • necessary only considering all that we know, therefore falsiable. If there were good reasons to consider something as false, it can in no sense be necessary anymore – Philip Klöcking Oct 09 '15 at 11:44
  • @Philip Klöcking Stating that the concept of knowledge a priori in the end is based on experience seems to me to seal the fate of the idea of knowledge a priori. – Jo Wehler Oct 09 '15 at 12:12
  • @JoWehler: Not if you are able to differentiate; Knowledge a priori is in its genesis dependent on experience. It is not logically dependent, but logically prior, though. But only regarding content, not genesis. In some sense, the weak point for Kant is that he seems to underestimate the process experience and its content is still in. If you think the genesis in flow, not finished, you may be able to retrieve the conception through history. – Philip Klöcking Oct 09 '15 at 12:14
  • so what is the difference between such a priori knowledge and other laws of physics? – nir Oct 09 '15 at 12:34
  • Laws of nature are in fact knowledge a priori. Because empirical knowledge in a strict sense are only solitary snap-shots of nature. The relations and laws between these snap-shots are performed by mind and reason (Verstand und Vernunft) and thought relational to them. It is a thought Sellars presents in Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind: Saying that the laws are experienced in nature is to be subject to the Myth of the Given, because it is saying that the laws "are found" or "underlying" nature. This is philosophically nonsense, he says. – Philip Klöcking Oct 09 '15 at 12:46
  • so you argue that the laws of nature are necessary (in the sense of the word necessary meant and used by Kant)? – nir Oct 09 '15 at 12:54
  • I some sense, yes. For Kant, the very term "law" includes a thought of necessity that we do not find in experience. Laws are rules constituting a necessary relation. That is what laws do. Therefore laws of nature (as long as they are not falsified) are necessary. And for him, there is no other necessity than the necessity imposed by reason (Vernunft). – Philip Klöcking Oct 09 '15 at 12:57
  • To add one thing: Laws of nature, even if they in fact are falsified, still include the thought of necessity, because it is the necessity of a relation expressed by the law. Experience, in a second step, is relational to the laws. And the laws only are falsifiable because of this relationality. But experience can in no way falsify the relation expressed by the law (its necessity), only the law as a whole and its validity. – Philip Klöcking Oct 09 '15 at 13:22
  • ...and this is because laws of nature are thought as laws of experience (in fact, nature is defined by Kant as the sum of all experience). – Philip Klöcking Oct 09 '15 at 13:34
  • It seems to conflict with (CPR B4) "experience never confers on its judgments true or strict, but only assumed and comparative universality, through induction. We can properly only say, therefore, that, so far as we have hitherto observed, there is no exception to this or that rule. If, then, a judgment is thought with strict universality, that is, in such manner that no exception is allowed as possible, it is not derived from experience, but is valid absolutely a priori. Empirical universality is only an arbitrary extension of a validity holding in most cases to one which holds in all" – nir Oct 09 '15 at 20:19
  • The point I wanted to stress is, that for Kant, there never was any idea to be able to falsify laws of nature because of the way he thought nature, therefore he could write what he did here. And that even this would not have to be a problem, if a priori would be said about the right thing. 2. The end of this sentence and the next one confirm what I wrote. Experience is not where judgements a priori come from. They come from reason and are about the structure of concepts. But concepts involve experience in their genesis.
  • – Philip Klöcking Oct 09 '15 at 21:15
  • @Philip Klöcking I apologize, but now you have have left me behind. I do not understand your comment about knowledge a priori - where you ask me to differentiate. - I am prepared to accept that also Kant was wrong in some of his fundamental claims. Recognizing errors and restating new hypotheses is the path to scientific progress. Why not accept it also for the humanities? We err upwards (Gerhard Vollmer) – Jo Wehler Oct 09 '15 at 22:22