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I could not give a better name for this theory, so I call it "Instrumentalist value theory". According to this theory nothing is intrinsically valuable. Nothing and no one can be treated as ends, but only as means. This in no way means being disrespectful towards others, because it is possible to get positive experience from respecting others (and therefore being respectful acquires instrumental value).

Satisfaction and dissatisfaction also are not intrinsically valuable: they helped people to survive and pass natural selection. Passing natural selection also is not intrinsically valuable... In the end for something to be intrinsically valuable there must be prime cause, but even if there is one, it is incomprehensible for our minds.

Further, there is no difference between "morally bad" and "bad in amoral sense". E.g. a bad pen is the one that does not write. The purpose of pen is to write and we want a pen to write, that's why the pen that does not write is bad. A human is bad when [s]he does what we wish them not to do: commiting crimes, abuse others, being greedy, etc. Animal also can be bad: rabid dog is bad because it's dangerous. There should be some actions taken in order for that dog not to infect people with rabies.

There can be some values which are universal: no sane person wants to live in unstable society where you can easily be killed, robbed, raped, etc. But there are some subjective and emotive values as well: some people do not like LGBT, while some people (not necessarily LGBT themselves) find it acceptable for them to exist.

Anything can be valuable only on a two-dimensional scale: aesthetical dimension and effective dimension. "Aesthethical" describes things which people like or don't like without any explanation. Why is pizza tasty? No reason. "Effective" describes what is useful or harmful. Mercury ointment is a harmful medicine, because it does not cure, but only causes more health problems. Effective values, in contrast with aesthetical, always can be shown by "because". While aesthetical values can be taken for intrinsic, nothing exists for its own sake. So, they are instrumental.

The one who wants to kill me at the same time choosing inflatable sword as a weapon over real knife, is wrong in effective sense. At the same time his actions are aesthetically unpleasing to me, because I do not want to die.

In this case "moral" can be seen as some kind of subset on given scale. But I find "morality" redundant. Like we don't need a separate term for a broken guitar, we don't need moral values, because everything can be shown to lie on this two-dimensional scale.

This theory denies the use of "morality", yet produces some propositions about actions considered moral/immoral. This leaves me the question: is this theory morally nihilistic? Is it philosophical or scientific? Ethics are considered to be a philosophy but if I reject morality, do I put it to the science?

rus9384
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  • A rabid dog is not bad it is just in an unfortunate situation for the dog, it's good for the rabies! – Callum Bradbury Jun 01 '18 at 09:14
  • @CallumBradbury, it's bad for the society and many individuals. Bad is not universal concept. Lion is bad for its prey, too fast animal that can run away from the lion is bad for the lion. – rus9384 Jun 01 '18 at 09:17
  • This is definitely philosophy and not science, but the rest is too vague to say. "Nothing is intrinsically valuable" can even cover religious ethics, it is God that supplies the value, and ethics with socially constructed values are typically not considered nihilistic. Some do use the term Ethical Instrumentalism, see Biehl 's paper. – Conifold Jun 01 '18 at 22:58
  • @Conifold, then if we assume any value could have its price (in currency, just an extreme example) this would not be nihilistic? – rus9384 Jun 02 '18 at 00:44
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    Moral nihilism means, literally, that nothing is morally wrong, there is no morality of any sort, not that there are no "intrinsic" values or "objective" norms. That is simply the denial of moral realism/objectivism. Not even moral skeptics, like Hume or Mackie, are nihilists, one is a sentimentalist, and the other a consequentialist. I am not sure what "value having its price" means outside of utilitarian context, but utilitarianism is not nihilism either. And denying that, say, humor is objectively intrinsic to some texts need not be nihilism about humor. – Conifold Jun 02 '18 at 01:10
  • @Conifold, but I hardly would agree moral nihilists reject any valuability. The example with pen is valid. At least when they need pen. The fact there is no essential difference between bad/good non-human and human. Maybe there are some psychological devices differentiating it in many humans, they all are the same for me. There is an object, there is a role applied to that object, there are qualities that are ascribed to that role in order for the object to be good. – rus9384 Jun 02 '18 at 12:30
  • I believe the term you are looking for is "moral anti-realism". One can be an anti-realist about a domain, humor, artistic taste, morality, mathematics, science, without dismissing it as an "illusion". All of these are mainstream positions, some even majority positions. There is a big distance between an illusion and being written into the fabric of being. A scientific realist can be anti-realist about desks, chairs or the distinction between fruits and vegetables, but being human dependent does not make them into illusions. – Conifold Jun 03 '18 at 19:11
  • @Conifold, I dismiss morality as being irrelevant. One can think of serial killer (SK) as of immoral, one can simply say he is dangerous, without mentioning morality. The only thing that matters SK is socially dangerous and should be put in isolation from society. My theory tries to overcome the "Is-ought" problem by saying any normative theory should answer the question "How to achieve the purpose?" instead of "What act is good?" It accepts sometimes it's impossible to convince others purpose X is good. Then other measures should be taken (and they already are, so theory also is descriptive). – rus9384 Jun 03 '18 at 20:48
  • "Your" theory is just run of the mill consequentialism (possibly utilitarianism if you think that all "purposes" ultimately reduce to a single utility), the only thing that matters are potential consequences. This is neither dismissal of morality (as conventionally understood) nor does it overcome the is-ought problem. Removing "morality" and "good" from language does not accomplish much, and they are convenient shorthands. – Conifold Jun 03 '18 at 21:34
  • @Conifold, I did not remove "good" from language. "Morality" is convenient for accusers. Also, you are confusing purpose of theory with purpose of action itself. According to me any existing normative theory is oriented to some purpose (Kantian ethics are oriented to rationality/justification of Kant's views; utilitarianism is oriented to pleasure; etc.) Since normative theory contains the purpose, it can't overcome the is-ought problem. I do not include purpose in my normative (I call it inventive) theory. I would be closer to pragmatic ethicist then to consequentialist. – rus9384 Jun 03 '18 at 21:57
  • Sorry but you lost me. I do not follow what you are doing with "good" or "purpose", or what you mean by "normative". And just like you, deontologists, or virtue ethicists for that matter, can deny that their theories involve "purpose". Those who postulate primitive oughts or virtues do not face the is-ought problem anyway. In any case, SE is not for promoting personal theories or discussing them. – Conifold Jun 03 '18 at 22:10
  • @Conifold, original question involved science. Maybe you're denying scientific method can be used in order to describe value theory in general. This includes meta-ethics as well. But it's unclear why the question "What can we refer to as good or bad?" can't be answered from the position of science. Authors of theories can't deny there are purposes, because there simply must be the answer why did they developed their theories. Is-ought problem arises when one say X is good and I disagree. He says X is good because it serves for purpose Y. I disagree that Y is a valuable purpose. – rus9384 Jun 03 '18 at 22:37
  • Authors of theories can deny whatever they choose to deny, and non-consequentialists deny that morality is subservient to purposes. Ad hominem is not a serious counter, their motives are distinct from the content of their positions. Even if it was purpose bound the problem of "good" simply shifts to the purposes. The last three sentences I do not understand at all, what you think the problem is, what you disagree with, or how it is supposed to help. This comment thread is too long already, so it is time to end it. – Conifold Jun 03 '18 at 23:11

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