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I'm trying to make sense of the ontological argument for god's existence.

So how I understand it... we define god as a "maximally great being". And the argument implies that "maximally great" includes existent by definition.

So couldn't I define arbitrary things with "existence" as part of the definition?

eg: "WErwerwe is defined as a 3 headed Martian that exists". Therefore WErwerwe exists.

"Super Santa Claus is an existent Santa Claus". Therefore Super Santa Claus exists.

Is the ontological argument something more than including existence in the definition?

Ameet Sharma
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    One version starts from, "God is possible," converts this modulo possible-worlds talk to, "God exists in some possible world," then notes that God is necessary, so again modulo pw-talk, "There is a possible world where there exists a being who exists in all possible worlds." Still question-begging but the author who came up with it called it "victorious" IIRC. – Kristian Berry Mar 17 '21 at 18:39
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    @Conifold, yes but that keeps the entire "maximizing perfection" idea... which I think just confuses things. Attaching "maximum perfection" to a concept is just a trick to attach "existence" to a concept. My point is that piggybacking "existence" on "perfection" doesn't achieve anything more than attaching "existence" directly. – Ameet Sharma Mar 17 '21 at 20:59
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    I think that was Gaunilo's point, he expressed it in terms of perfection simply because Anselm did so. Correspondingly, Anselm's (and other) responses to Gaunilo address your point directly, whether it is phrased in terms of existence or perfection. The gist is that the argument does not appeal to a general form "X is defined as perfect/existent, therefore X exists" with X=God. Since any other existence is derived from God's, hence contingent, nothing else can be validly substituted for X (for what it is worth). – Conifold Mar 17 '21 at 21:48
  • Reading the response on wikipedia: "ontological argument which can only ever properly apply to the single greatest being of all beings". I don't understand this. I mean he's saying the ontological argument only works for a being that is the greatest in "all regards", rather than "one regard". But I don't see anything in the ontological argument that works better for a being perfect in "all regards" rather than "one regard". – Ameet Sharma Mar 18 '21 at 05:09
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    The flaw of the argument is to assume that existence is a property; if we do not agree on it, the definition of the concept of an "entity endowed of all properties" does not imply existence. But see also Francesco Berto, Existence as a Real Property : The Ontology of Meinongianism (Springer, 2013) – Mauro ALLEGRANZA Mar 18 '21 at 07:17
  • @MauroALLEGRANZA,right. And if we allow existence as a property, then we can define all sorts of arbitrary things into existence, like an "existent unicorn" or an "existent santa claus". But Anselm seems to have objected that the ontological argument only works for the "maximally great being" ie: god and not these other entities. I don't get why this would be the case. – Ameet Sharma Mar 18 '21 at 07:35
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    Anselm never denied existent unicorns as such, he would say they exist in the understanding, and so rather than existence simpliciter we have to refer to two forms of existence, inside and outside the understanding. You can define anything as existing in the understanding but you need something else to show existence outside of it. – Kristian Berry Mar 18 '21 at 13:12
  • Does "2" exists? Realist like Plato would say yes (in some form realm other than our perceived world), while a nominalist like Ockham would say no. Same situation for your ontological argument, so you cannot arbitrarily add "existence" as part of the definition. It's the inevitable epistemic (perceptual or conceptual) result based on the definer's metaphysical position. Otherwise it will become confused and logically self-contradict... – Double Knot Mar 23 '21 at 05:03

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