Agnosticism does not discount the possibility of god, soul, afterlife, etc, because "absence of evidence is not evidence of absence"
What are the arguments against that position?
Agnosticism does not discount the possibility of god, soul, afterlife, etc, because "absence of evidence is not evidence of absence"
What are the arguments against that position?
The bind that gnostic atheism always encounters is the need to define its terms, and the problems of accepting a community definition without in turn prioritizing certain theological communities over others. If you presume that the definition that matters is a Christian one (a position often taken by anglophonic thinkers on the topic), and you say with conviction that it is false that the Christian God exists (a position which I happen to think is reasonable), why should this position be taken as decisive as regards Theology in general?
A certain amount of substantial Theological positioning is needed as a prerequisite to this stronger claim - some community understanding needs to be held up as archetypal or canonical in order for challenges to that understanding to be informative as regards the wider scope of the claim.
Agnosticism is often misused in arguments about God. And there is a current movement labeling themselves Agnostic Atheists, which I think is what you are basing this question on.
Agnostic atheists generally base their views on the thesis that without certainty, they cannot claim knowledge (a-gnostic), and they cannot ever know a negative with certainty. And without certainty, they can reject God clams, as the default view should be to reject unproven claims.
This rationale fails to follow any of the principles of knowledge that we use in science. First, negatives can be known all the time -- and is actually the most common method of doing existence tests. Postulate an effect, object, or phenomenon, derive predictions from its presumption, and then look for whether they obtain or not. If not, then the postulation is refuted. This is "proving a negative". Second -- we cannot be certain of AYTHING in science -- but that does not prevent our gaining knowledge through the science process. Certainty is not necessary for knowledge.
Additionally, a-gnostic atheists apply two mode logic to propositions, of proven/unproven to empirical questions, while empiricism operates on a four mode logic:
Relative to God claims, status 3 is ignorance, and is the default view one should have of a proposition about God(s). And moving off ignorance does not require "proof". Status 4 relative to a god claim, was given the name Agnosticism by Thomas Huxley. If Agnosticism applies to theism, that is the most decisive rejection of a God thesis one can have in empiricism.
To argue for gnostic atheism, the testing method is difficult to apply, because of the huge range of possible types of Gods. Tests for some, will not exclude others. Gnostic atheists therefore take different tacks.
a) The most common of these tacks is to argue that the type of being a God is -- a spiritual being, does not exist, because our world is physical. Therefore there can be no Gods. Physicalism is widely assumed within philosophy, and by gnostic atheists, but the justification for accepting physicalism is true is more frequently presumed than argued. Papineau's insightful essay The Rise of Physicalism notes that physicalism is supported by its greater predictive power vs. spiritual dualism, but that dualism is not refuted. Also, two recent books by now ex-physicalists mote that physicalism appears to be explicitly UNtrue -- one based on Hempel's dilemma plus modern physics not really being material, and the other based on qualia: https://www.amazon.com/Physicalism-Problems-Philosophy-Daniel-Stoljar/dp/0415452627/ref=sr_1_1?crid=CNB58ZC0B32A&keywords=physicalism+stoljar&qid=1644390992&sprefix=physicalism+stoljar%2Caps%2C150&sr=8-1 https://www.amazon.com/Physicalism-Something-Princeton-Monographs-Philosophy/dp/0691133859/ref=sr_1_8?crid=CNB58ZC0B32A&keywords=physicalism+stoljar&qid=1644391022&sprefix=physicalism+stoljar%2Caps%2C150&sr=8-8 So the "physicalism is proven" route may be a rocky one.
b) An alternative route takes the Papineau argument further and argues that physically based science has been so successful, and left so few "gaps", that it is reasonable to simply assume physicalism is true. Or alternatively if it turns out there are spirits or Gods, they are so irrelevant to our world that they can be ignored.
c) A third route to arguing gnostic atheism is to perform falsification tests on the Abrahamic Gods, the Hindu Gods, the Shinto gods, and the Gods of classical Paganism, and then draw an inference that if these most widely accepted as plausible Gods all are refuted, then it is reasonable to infer that all God claims are refuted.
d) There is a route of direct knowledge, that is available to atheistic spiritual dualists. This is implicit in Buddhism, as the Enlightened Ones discern the reality of our universe, and that reality has no Gods or spirits.
So -- A-gnostic atheism is based on a poor understanding of the scientific/empirical process, but there are a variety of paths available to support gnostic atheism.
Atheism states: God does not exist. Until now the question of God’s existence could not be decided by proving his/her existence or non-existence. I expect that the situation will not change in future.
Arguments for atheism can follow a different approach:
For the whole topic see John L. Mackie: "The Miracle of Theism. Arguments for and against the Existence of God."
There is a contemporary dialectic regarding the "hiddenness" of God that turns on the contention that if a certain class of divine being existed, It would surely (or at least "probably") makes Its existence known not only to some people, but everyone without almost any distinction. At the very least (per that dialectic), what is called "nonresistant nonbelief" is contraindicated in the event that a particularly loving and capable deity exists.
Kant argued somewhere (although I'm having trouble remembering where exactly) that even if God exists, It created our faculties of knowledge in such a way that It cannot prove Its existence to us (his phrasing is, I think, something like, "Even if we could prove to ourselves God's existence, we would not know how to communicate the proof in public"). Some people who use higher-end psychedelics (e.g. DMT) claim to undergo such a profound transformation of their consciousness that they do bear direct and absolute witness to divine reality (they even have a fancy, if clunky, adjective for it: kalonkinesioöptic, AKA "my senses of sight specifically, and beauty overall, were crossed with my skin so it was like looking in every direction out from my body at once, at the eternal light of glory"). On the other hand, they also tend to go on about perceiving things "outside of space and time" while nevertheless being able to precisely situate their perception within spatiotemporal brackets (from the moment they took in a sufficient dose of the drug until the moment the drug wore off enough).
But so in turn, there is something suspicious about phrases like "outside of space and time." I understand (not in great detail, but not too obscurely either) what talk of higher-dimensional (even infinite-dimensional, perhaps even V-dimensional) spacetime would refer to; talk of something having no such character surpasses my understanding completely, however. I presume that claims like, "Time is an illusion," are using Time and illusion in a special sense, and so the claim can be said to go through in some context, but in more ordinary terms, such claims are inherently unscientific (no experiment can ever be timelessly conducted apart from our empirical position in space). With respect to the possibility of knowing such a God, then, I would be hard pressed to take mystical revelations at face value: one of the classical legends does not say that Moses always saw God's face inside his own human spirit, but specifically when he ascended a certain mountain. (I waive the Maimonidean rationalist gloss of Moses/prophets, here.)
Taken altogether, then, these lines of reasoning lend support to an atheistic argument from asemanticism: if the word "God" has no intelligible possible reference, then it's not so much that no one knows whether God exists, but that the very question, "Does God exist?" has no substantial answers, and hence is vacuously solved for by, "No, no such thing exists." When and where sense can be attached to words like, "God," though, the question opens up a little more, and we might find ourselves in the position of trying to presume that we know what God would do, relative to our epistemic capacities, in order to know what God has, or (if nonexistent) has not, done. The argument from love resonates with a lot of people at least insofar as their motive for even hoping that God exists is for the sake of such transcendent love.
But so it seems like the most that could be ruled out, in this event, is the existence of a God Who has a reason to reveal Itself to us. Whether there is a God as a unitary creator of worlds would advert to whether divine unity or creativity depend on such reasons: Nicholas Rescher's theory of axiogenesis would have that said creativity is quintessentially caught up with divine benevolence, for example. With respect to Rescher's own theory, he can't have abstract goodness at all without possible creativity (and vice versa), so his argument would require God to exist just on account of either possible attribute. If a different concept of such creativity and goodness is correct, "Does God exist?" opens up again, though.
There are infinitely many magic entities that could exist without being seen. The Yeti, Smurfs, the tooth fairy, the Easter bunny and so on.
Most of those infinitely many possible magic entities are rejected by rational people in any case, without proof. Atheists just extend this approach to all those entities, without illogical arbitrary exceptions. As auch atheism is a consistent approach to the problem of not being able to disprove infinitely many possible but unseen entities, whereas theism is a logically inconsistent approach making a convenient exception for one magical creature but being atheist about all others.