That there are no neutral claims involving “is” (or the verb to be) by our limited nature. I can see how this would solve a lot of problems, but not all the problems it may cause.
Just wondering if this is an existing criticism of Hume’s is/ought or his use of it.
I was thinking maybe it applies to platonism where independence precludes any human’s perfect characterization of the abstract. So we either shouldn’t utter any “is”’s about it /abstract objects, or realize any “is” we do say about them is loaded with oughts. That any claim of or toward platonism is an ought because of the independence aspect. But I would say this may extend to everything, we never have perfect knowledge by our nature.
(Maybe this is antithetical to the analytic tradition, and I’m certainly not ready and willing to mount that task! Does any philosopher go down this road?)