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Would it be correct to affirm that what has been called Continental philosophy (existentialism: Kierkeggard, Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, Heidegger, Sartre; phenomenology: Husserl, Merleau-Ponty; vitalism: Bergson; postmodernism: Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze) tends to be a continuation of metaphysics, while what has been called Analytic philosophy (logic-positivism: Carnap, Russell; Quine, etc.) tends to be a departure from it?

NB: This question differs from this one, in the extent that it considers continental philosophy in general, and analytic philosophy in general (not only their early days).

Starckman
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    Curious about the motive for question? – Scott Rowe Mar 26 '23 at 12:12
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    I think there is plenty of analytical metaphysics. Take Jordan Sobel's "Logic and Theism" - I would say it is analytic since it uses logic, and about metaphysics since it examines arguments for and against god, which is usually a topic in metaphysics. It's only one example, but there are many others. – Frank Mar 26 '23 at 13:21
  • @Frank Edited, thanks – Starckman Mar 26 '23 at 14:45
  • @ScottRowe What do you mean? – Starckman Mar 26 '23 at 14:45
  • @Starckman I don't think that logic (analytic philosophy) and metaphysics are at odds. Metaphysics seems to want to use logic. Just sample the SEP entries on topics related to metaphysics, and you'll find plenty of logic. – Frank Mar 26 '23 at 15:49
  • We'll, normally people have something in mind when they ask quite specific either / or questions where the likely answers are Yes or No. Since I know little about the distinction you are drawing, I think you must be searching for a confirmation of some other question that led to this one. – Scott Rowe Mar 26 '23 at 17:42
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    No. Both of them departed from metaphysics, in a continuation of Kant's critique (Husserl, Wittgenstein), and then came back to it, but with different understandings of what metaphysics is meant to accomplish. Continental philosophy embraced bold speculation with grand implications (Deleuze, Badiou, Meillassoux), and analytic philosophy the more pragmatic aspect of carefully devising a picture of the world consistent with science (Sellars, Putnam, McDowell). – Conifold Mar 26 '23 at 19:50
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    @ScottRowe This question is in continuation of this one https://philosophy.stackexchange.com/questions/98236/what-is-the-difference-between-metaphysics-supernaturalism-and-idealism – Starckman Mar 27 '23 at 01:37
  • @Conifold But then why this response here https://philosophy.stackexchange.com/questions/15992/did-early-analytic-philosophers-reject-metaphysics?rq=1, and why Carnap wrote vehemently against metaphysics? – Starckman Mar 27 '23 at 03:29
  • As did Mach before him in the empiricist tradition, and Husserl on the other side around the same time. Absolute idealists went overboard with it in the 19th century, there was a reaction, it blew over. Already Quine started to rehabilitate metaphysics among empiricists, albeit half-heartedly, and Kripke brought it back into vogue. Scientific realists and physicalists ran with it. – Conifold Mar 27 '23 at 03:52
  • "Absolute idealists went overboard with it in the 19th century" went overboard with metaphysics or with idealism? – Starckman Mar 27 '23 at 04:27

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There are philosophers in both traditions that have looked at metaphysical issues (David Lewis, Saul Kripke in the analytic tradition, for example). There are also philosophers in both traditions who have looked at other issues (Walter Benjamin and Foucalt are famous continental epistemologists).

In addition, most philosophers contribute more broadly than that. Husserl's major contributions involved epistemological and metaphilosophical contributions, including the phenomenological method itself. Kierkegaard's works have strong ethical implications and questions, especially with regards to Christian morality.

Similarly, even if we stick to the hardcore analytics of Wittgenstein and Russell, we get metaphysical discussions of things like logical atomism.

It seems unlikely that there was a tendency when Continental Philosophy went towards metaphysics and analytical philosophy didn't.

The Thought Detective
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