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True, my question is roughly identical to this one Did early analytic philosophers reject metaphysics? , yet I don’t find the answers fulfilling.

I have done some light reading on logical empiricism. It is said that they condoned only two forms of knowledge, that which can be “verified” in some particular sense, and that which is logical.

Why would this exclude metaphysics (and ethics and aesthetics, as commonly said)? Metaphysics has always struck me as a deeply mathematical and logical topic. In fact, I had always considered that logic was the basis of metaphysics, that metaphysics was a corollary of logic; a collection of necessary statements about the nature of the world.

Perhaps the question hinges on what they meant by “verification”? I would assume that means something akin to phenomenology: direct conscious experience.

Julius Hamilton
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    I don't know enough to make an answer, but I would suggest that positivists don't so much reject metaphysics as reject the notion that most people speculating about metaphysics have any beliefs to reject in the first place. – g s Feb 03 '24 at 21:34

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Contemporay analytical metaphysics is a much different species than the, say, speculative metaphysics of the Scholastics. Philosophy, especially when taken in league with theology, can ponder topics whose ontology diverges tragically from the modern ontology of contemporary science. In fact, angels dancing on the head of a pin its the sort of absurdity that non-scientific ontology allows.

The logical positivists looked at religion and pseudoscience as problematic and tried to find a way to draw a line in the sand between science and the empirically undisciplined missing of ontologies that admit entities like magic, gods, and alchemical transformation. Attacking metaphysics, which is laden with metaphysical presupposition, seemed the best way. The project failed because language and observation is normative, since the analytical and synthetic and fact and value are convenient fictions of category.

J D
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  • Thanks. True, but I partially meant in response to Dcleve’s statement “Logical Positivists tried to pretend that they did not have internal experiences, and that all observations don't involve first person experience. They also tried to pretend that we have direct experience of our world, rather than inferred indirect realism.”. Perhaps you would know more on that? – Julius Hamilton Feb 03 '24 at 22:05
  • They're not "convenient fictions". They just aren't. –  Feb 04 '24 at 07:04
  • Also to call medieval metaphysics very "speculative" (a term introduced by Fichte in the XVIII/XIX century anyway) is a great overstatement. –  Feb 04 '24 at 07:09
  • @abcga Medival thinking took Aristotle serious for physics, posited humors, and heavily debated rather than debunked a non-existent God. Given how each theory falls short of what sciences take to be literal truth today, I'm not sure how that's not excessive speculation. As for the two dichotomies, neither holds under a rigorous conceptual analysis. It's best to think of the language that surrounds them as useful, but leaky grammars and an easy way to obfuscate one's metaphysical presumptions. But as always, I appreciate you sharing your opinions (in the case that you are confusing them w facts – J D Feb 04 '24 at 16:48
  • @JD What does Aristotle being a pre-Newtonian physicist have anything to do with metaphysics? Everything that Newton ever said is far from what we nowadays consider true, but it is of course more accurate (keep in mind that 2000 years separates Aristotle and Newton but only ca. 300 years Newton and Einstein).

    I think the common sense presumption that disagreement about meanings is different than disagreement about matters of fact is very harmful, not at all useful. This might be my "opinion", but I am willing to argue for it. There was a time where heliocentrism was an "opinion" afterall.

     –  Feb 04 '24 at 17:21
  • @abcga "What does Aristotle being a pre-Newtonian physicist have anything to do with metaphysics?" Self-evidently Aristotle's metaphysics IS pre-Newtonian, and thus, by contemporary standards, heavily inadequate, a point appropriately maintained by logical positivism. The logical empiricists and positivists were against heavy metaphysical debate and epistemological tomfoolery detached from empirical and observational grounding. "2000 years separates Aristotle and Newton but only ca. 300 years Newton and Einstein". And the same is true of the distance between the antikythera mechanism, Zuse, .. – J D Feb 04 '24 at 17:46
  • and quantum computing. But the spacing of the historical accidents is no relevance when we examine synchronically. And you should argue for your opinion. It is the job of a philosopher. I have no complaints about anyone advocating their "boos" and "yays". It's what makes life intellectually interesting. – J D Feb 04 '24 at 17:48
  • Your contributions to this forum are a plus, not a minus. – J D Feb 04 '24 at 17:49
  • @JD "And you should argue for your opinion" - Okay? Maybe not in a comment restricted to 600 characters? Regarding the relation of logical positivism to Aristotle you are just making stuff up. I have never seen any logical positivist complaining about Aristotle and anything related to his followers or his work certainly wasn't the motivation for their program. Also, it is not true that Aristotle's metaphysics is "highly inadequate" by "contemporary standards" because it is pre-Newtonian. In many respects his metaphysical ideas are still relevant. –  Feb 04 '24 at 17:56
  • @JD And where they're inadequate it is mostly because Aristotle didn't systematically develop them. For example, his brilliant notion of the categories wasn't taken up by anyone until Kant who rightly accused Aristotle for choosing his praedicamenta quite randomly. Yes, in some respects, Aristotle's Physics influences his Metaphysics, but no one ever maintained after Newton that these aspects are relevant to what is valuable in his work. Finally, "epistemological tomfoolery detached from empirical and observational grounding" is what the logical positivists advocated. –  Feb 04 '24 at 18:02
  • @abcga All of that is true, without a doubt. The OP's question sought an explication of why logical positivism was hostile to metaphysics, and I think that the question has been answered in detail at this point. Some philosophy is amenable to theological concerns, others to pseudoscience, and still others to science. The logical positivists rejected the phenomenological characterization of experience including even post-Kantian scientific doctrines like German idealism and phenomenology because they represented a flavor of scientism. – J D Feb 04 '24 at 18:29
  • Aristotle was brilliant and influential, Kant too. So is Carnap and Quine, and that is why the OP is trying to tease apart the expert opinions of these brilliant men. – J D Feb 04 '24 at 18:31
  • @JD Okay, but then why did you mention Aristotle? It seems to me that this argument was entirely unnecessary, given what you now say. Anyway, I don't think logical positivism rejected Husserlian picture of experience. The influence of Husserl's notion of construction on Carnap's Aufbau is quite well-known. Regarding German idealism a lot could be said, but I think it's unnecessary to continue this discussion, so I will remain silent. –  Feb 04 '24 at 18:43
  • Why Aristotle? Between him and Plato, it's hard to view a contemporary philosophical debate that doesn't in some way owe its origins to both me. I mention Aristotle because Scholasticism and Logical Positivism are two very distinct approaches to philosophy, and its fair to claim that Aristotle and Scholastic thinking are heavily entwined in their view of the natural world, and distinctly so from a post-Kantian perspective. Phenomenology is of course fundamental, I believe, to a modern philosophical view of the world. Husserl's views on science I think should be required reading for any... – J D Feb 04 '24 at 20:28
  • philosopher of science, but be that as it may, the direction logical positivism went, especially in the pursuit of objective observation statements fundamentally refuses to admit phenomenological thinking in the way that Russellian atomism has no regard for how language is actually rooted in conceptual processing and language production. Both lead the modern thinker down a bad path, as evidenced by the Simon and Newell's physical symbol system hypothesis; there's much to be said, but this forum is like the twitter of philosophy, so much violence is done to ideas. ; ) – J D Feb 04 '24 at 20:34